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THE USE OF LIS PENDENS IN ACTIONS ALLEGING
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS OR EQUITABLE LIENS: DUE
PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
The lis pendens statute' in California has been subjected to
much criticism by commentators. Once filed, a lis pendens gives con-
structive notice of pending litigation affecting the title to, or posses-
sion, of real property. It ensures the recording party priority in the
property for any judgment secured in the action over any other prop-
erty interest acquired subsequent to its filing.'
A lis pendens creates a cloud on title,' rendering the property
virtually unmarketable. Consequently, its pervasive effect lends a
plaintiff considerable leverage in any lawsuit. The requirements for
filing are simple-the recording party need only have a claim pur-
porting to affect the title to, or possession of, real property.4 While it
serves a proper function, the ease with which a lis pendens can be
filed contributes to its abuse. Thus, most judicial decisions construing
the statute are concerned with its application rather than its
purpose.5
Recently, in Coppinger v. Superior Court,' the Fourth District
Court of Appeal held that an action to impose a constructive trust on
real property was an action "affecting title to or possession of real
property" and therefore within the purview of the lis pendens stat-
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1. CAL. Civ. PRoC. CODE § 409 (Deering 1972 & Supp. 1983) provides in pertinent
part:
In an action concerning real property or affecting the title or the right of posses-
sion of real property, the plaintiff, at the time of filing the complaint . . . may
record. . . a notice of the pendency of the action. . . . From the time of filing
such notice for record only, shall a purchaser or encumbrancer of the property
affected thereby be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the
action as it relates to the real property ....
2. CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, REVIEW OF 1968 CODE LEGis-
LATION 60 (1968) [hereinafter cited as CEB].
3. Id.
4. See CAL. CIv. PRoC. CODE § 409 (Deering 1972 & Supp. 1983).
5. Comment, Abuses of the California Lis Pendens: An Appeal for Legislative Remedy,
39 S. CAL. L. REV. 108, 110-11 (1956). See also Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d 375, 295
P.2d 405 (1966); Allied E. Fin. v. Goheen Enter., 265 Cal. App. 2d 131, 71 Cal. Rptr. 126
(1968).
6. 134 Cal. App. 3d 883, 185 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1982).
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ute. The equitable remedy of a constructive trust, however, may be
used as a device to secure a claim seeking money damages8 regardless
of whether the underlying claim concerns particular real property,
and thus may be an abuse of the lis pendens statute.
Consequently, Coppinger raises questions concerning the uni-
queness and necessity of the subject property to satisfy a particular
plaintiff's claims. The lis pendens procedure may not fairly accomo-
date the competing interests of the plaintiff, defendant and state in
the property. The less unique the real property is to a plaintiff, or
necessary to effective resolution of the underlying claim, the more
questionable the use of the lis pendens procedure.
This comment reviews the purpose and procedure of the lis
pendens statute and critically analyzes Coppinger v. Superior
Court.' Additionally, the comment explores the constitutional impli-
cations of the use of a lis pendens in actions seeking to impose the
equitable remedies of constructive trusts and equitable liens, and
suggests alternatives to the present lis pendens procedure which
would better accomodate the competing interests in the property.
II. Lis PENDENS
A. Purpose
Generally, a person who is not a party to an action is not bound
by its judgment. The exception to that common law rule was the
pendente lite1° purchaser of real property. "The mere existence of
litigation affecting real property was said to impart constructive no-
tice to all the world that any purchasers, pendente lite, would take
the property subject to the outcome of the action." California's lis
pendens statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 409, was enacted to
ameliorate the harshness of the common law rule."'
7. Id. at 891, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 29.
8. A iis pendens will not, however, support a claim for money damages alone. Allied E.
Fin. v. Goheen Enter., 265 Cal. App. 2d 131, 71 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1968). See also Albertson v.
Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d 375, 295 P.2d 405 (1956); Parker v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 397,
88 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1970).
9. 134 Cal. App. 3d 883, 185 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1982).
10. "Pending the suit, during actual progress of a suit; during litigation." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1020 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
11. Comment, supra note 5, at 109.
12. The 1872 enactment altered the common law exception and provided that upon the
litigant's failure to file a lis pendens, a bona fide purchaser was not bound by any judgment
subsequently rendered. "We consider our statute, not as giving new rights to the plaintiff, but
as a limitation upon the rights which he had before. If no lis pendens be filed, the party
acquiring an interest or claim pendente lite stands wholly unaffected by the suit." Richardson
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The lis pendens doctrine was judicially developed in an effort to
retain control of property subject to litigation. 8 The doctrine is illus-
trative of the universal presumption that real property is unique, and
that its loss is not compensable in money damages. "
Once recorded, a lis pendens gives constructive notice of pend-
ing litigation affecting real property.15 The party recording the lis
pendens gains priority over any interest acquired in the property
subsequent to filing.' 6
Few judicial decisions construe the "essence or purpose" of the
lis pendens statute; most focus on its application." California case
law adheres to the theory that the lis pendens was designed primar-
ily to give notice to third parties and not to aid plaintiffs in pursuing
their claims.1 8 Most authorities, however, recognize that its use pro-
motes the efficient administration of justice.1 In this sense, its use
parallels that of pre-judgment attachment remedies.20 Regardless of
the theory subscribed to, the practical effect of a lis pendens is to
preserve the status quo between the parties during litigation. Other-
wise, litigation would be meaningless because judgments could be de-
feated by the transfer of property pendente lite.'
B. Procedure
The only condition for filing a lis pendens is that the underly-
v. White, 18 Cal. 102, 107 (1861). See also Ault v. Gassaway, 18 Cal. 205 (1861).
13. Comment, supra note 5, at 109.
14. Cf Porporato v. Devincinzi, 261 Cal. App. 2d 670, 68 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1968) (party
seeking specific performance of a land sale contract can rely on historic presumption that land
is unique and need not prove inadequacy of money damages to compensate for breach).
15. The notice must contain the names of the parties, the object of the action or cross
action, and a description of the affected property. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §409 (Deering 1972
& Supp. 1983).
16. The recording party gains priority in the property itself, for any judgment secured
in the action. See, CEB, supra note 2.
17. See supra note 5.
18. See, e.g., Allied E. Fin. v. Goheen Enter., 265 Cal. App. 2d at 131, 71 Cal. Rptr. at
127 (1968).
19. E.g., Comment, Does California's Statutory Lis Pendens Violate Procedural Due
Process?, 6 PAC. L.J. 62, 76 (1975).
20. See Howden-Goetzl v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. App. 3d 135, 138, 86 Cal. Rptr. 323,
326 (1970).
21. "The creditor's need for security is great, particularly when the dispute involves
land. An action for specific performance for the sale of real property by one claiming owner-
ship would be of little importance if a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice of the
pending action acquired the property during the pendency of the law suit." Note, Lis Pendens
and Procedural Due Process, I PEPPERDINE L. REV. 433, 440 (1974). Cf. CAL. CIv. CODE §
3387 (Deering 1972) (presumption that money damages are not adequate compensation for
breach of agreement to transfer real property).
41 n Jl t t ........
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ing cause of action must affect title to or possession of real prop-
erty.22 Once filed, its effect continues until a final judgment is ren-
dered and time for appeal has expired in the underlying cause of
action, or, until the case is settled or dismissed."3 One California
court observed that "[tihe oppressive quality of a notice of any lis
pendens is obvious. A plaintiff may make a parcel of real property
unmarketable for a period of two to five years, or more, while a civil
action works its way through the courts."21 4 It was this "oppressive
quality" that often coerced property owners faced with a lis pendens
to settle claims in excess of their true worth. 5 Therefore, a lis
pendens is an aggressive weapon in any litigation. The relatively
easy filing requirements promote abuse of the statute.2" The lis
pendens expungement process, enacted in 1968, was designed to curb
such abuse.27  Any party to the action can move to expunge the lis
pendens under either of two procedures.2 8 Under section 409.1,29 the
22. Although the statute also states that a lis pendens may be filed "[i]n an action con-
cerning real property," that phrase was added in 1959 to conform to federal legislative re-
quirements. It was not intended to broaden the class of actions to which the statute was appli-
cable. 34 CAL. ST. B.J. 629 (1959). See also Allied E. Fin. v. Goheen Enter., 265 Cal. App.
2d 131, 71 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1968); Kendall-Brief v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. App. 3d 462, 131
Cal. Rptr. 515 (1976).
23. CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE LAW AND PRACTICE § 121:33 (Mathew Bender ed.
1982). "Once the lis pendens was recorded, regardless of the merits of the action that gave rise
to it, the landowner found it difficult to obtain either prospective purchasers or reputable
lending institutions willing to deal with the property." CEB, supra note 2, at 60 (citing Met-
ropolitan News (Los Angeles) Sept. 14, 1965, at 1). See Allied E. Fin. v. Goheen Enter., 265
Cal. App. 2d at 134, 71 Cal. Rptr at 127, 128 (recognizing that a lis pendens restricts the
property's marketability).
24. Nash v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d 690, 700, 150 Cal. Rptr. 394, 400 (1978).
25. Alexander, Lis Pendens Reform by Land Attachment, 43 L.A. BAR BULL. 419
(1968).
26. CEB, supra note 2, at 60. "Earlier proposals requiring the party noticing the lis
pendens to post a bond had been rejected by the legislature." Howden-Goetzl v. Superior
Court, 7 Cal. App. 3d at 138 n.1, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 324 n.1 (citing State Bar 1966 Conference
Resolutions 8 and 17, 42 STATE BAR J. 200-202 (1967); State Bar 1967 Resolution 1, 43
STATE BAR J. 314 (1968); S.B. 1458, California Legislature, 1967 Regular Sess. (amending
CAL. CIv. CODE § 490).
27. CEB, supra note 2, at 60.
28. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 409.1, 409.2 (Deering 1972 & Supp. 1983). Even if the
notice is expunged, a purchaser may still take the property subject to any judgment rendered if
the purchaser had actual notice of the litigation, apart from a normal title search.
29. CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 409.1 (Deering 1972 & Supp. 1983) provides in pertinent
part:
At any time after pendency of an action has been recorded . . . the court ...
shall, upon motion of a party to the action ...order that the notice be ex-
punged, unless the party filing the notice shows to the satisfaction of the court,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that:
(a) The action does affect title to or right of possession of the real property
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notice will be expunged upon a motion unless the recording party
shows the court by a "preponderance of the evidence" that the un-
derlying action affects the title or possession of the real property de-
scribed in the notice and was filed in good faith."0 Alternatively, ex-
pungement under section 409.281 does not place in issue the right to
record a lis pendens. Instead, it provides that a court may expunge
the lis pendens if it finds that adequate relief can be secured for the
recording party by the moving party's posting of security."2
The expungement procedures have been criticized for their
summary treatment of the merits of the underlying claim."' In Mal-
colm v. Superior Court, 4 the California Supreme Court held that
the expungement process was not a "minitrial" on the merits of the
underlying case.8" Thus, courts are severely restricted and may not
described in the notice; and
(b) Insofar as the action affects title to or the right of possession of the real
property described in the notice, the party recording the notice has commenced
or prosecuted the action for proper purpose and in good faith.
30. Whether the party noticing the lis pendens "commenced or prosecuted the action for
a proper purpose and in good faith" is measured subjectively. "Not in good faith" means that
the person initiating the action does not believe in its validity. CAL. Civ. PIoc. CODE § 409.1
(Deering 1972 & Supp. 1983). "Improper purpose" means that the action was begun out of
hostility or for the purpose of forcing a settlement. United Professional Planning v. Superior
Court 9 Cal. App. 3d 377, 388, 88 Cal. Rptr. 551, 557 (1970) (citing Albertson v. Raboff, 46
Cal. 2d 375, 383, 295 P.2d 405, 410 (1956)). See also Brownlee v. Vang, 206 Cal. App. 2d
814, 24 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1962) (notice expunged because court could not determine if property
described in notice was same as described in complaint).
31. CAL. CIv. PIoc. CODE § 409.2 (Deering 1972 & Supp. 1983) provides in pertinent
part:
At any time after notice of pendency of an action has been recorded . . . the
court. . . may order that the notice be expunged if the moving party shall have
given an undertaking of such nature, in such amount and within such time as
shall be fixed by the court after notice and hearing, such undertaking to be to
the effect that the moving party will indemnify the party recording the notice for
all damages which he may incur if the notice is expunged and the moving party
does not prevail and if the court finds that adequate relief can be secured to the
party recording the notice by the giving of such undertaking.
32. Section 409.2 motions present two issues: (1) whether adequate relief can be secured
by posting an undertaking; and, (2) what amount constitutes an adequate undertaking.
Trapasso v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 561, 570, 140 Cal. Rptr. 820, 825 (1977). See
also Stewart Dev. Co. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 3d 266, 166 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1980).
33. E.g., Comment, supra note 5.
34. 29 Cal. 3d 518, 629 P.2d 495, 174 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1981).
35. Id. at 527, 629 P.2d at 499, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 698. Malcolm concerned an alleged
oral contract to sell the real property in question. The court, in construing the expungement
procedure under § 409.1, stated:
There is nothing in the language of the statute to suggest that the legislature
intended to require a plaintiff to demonstrate the likelihood of its success at trial
in order to avoid the expungement of a lis pendens; likewise, there is nothing in
the language of the statute to indicate that the legislature intended to transform
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consider what merits lie behind the recording of a lis pendens.3a A
court may look to the merits only upon the introduction of indepen-
dent evidence of bad faith or improper purpose,"7 but again, its in-
quiry is limited; the merits may only be considered to measure the
integrity of the submitted evidence."8
III. COPPINGER V. SUPERIOR COURT
Diana and Donald Coppinger (defendants) were the owners of
a home sold to Diane McKay (plaintiff). In June, 1980, defendants
discovered termites coming through a crack in the foundation of their
residence and had them exterminated. Plaintiff subsequently bought
defendants' home in July, 1980, and took possession in September.
In February 1981, plaintiff noticed termites3 ' and in December
brought an action against the defendants alleging fraud in the in-
ducement of the residential sales contract.'" Plaintiff pleaded in the
alternative, requesting either compensatory and punitive damages
against defendants, or rescission of the sale and the imposition of a
constructive trust on defendants' new property. The day after filing
the complaint, plaintiff filed a lis pendens on defendants' new home.
Defendants moved to expunge the notice. The trial court denied the
motion and defendants appealed.' 1
On appeal, the court rejected defendants' contention that plain-
tiff was required to produce evidence that the action affected title to
or possession of real property and was commenced for a proper pur-
pose and in good faith. The court stated that plaintiff could rely on
the pretrial expungement procedure into any type of minitrial on the merits of
the case.
Id. at 526-27, 629 P.2d at 499, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 698. Accord Peery v. Superior Court, 29
Cal. 3d 837, 633 P.2d 198, 176 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1981) (only in post-judgment context may a
court consider merits in light of trial court's findings and judgment).
36. The Malcolm court stated that the critical inquiry was whether the recording party
commenced the action in "good faith" and for a "proper purpose." 29 Cal. 3d at 523, 629 P.2d
at 497, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
37.' United Professional Planning v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d at 385, 88 Cal.
Rptr. at 555.
38. Malcolm v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d at 529, 629 P.2d at 501, 174 Cal. Rptr. at
700.
39. An inspection revealed more termites coming from additional cracks in the founda-
tion of the house. Coppinger v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 886, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
40. Plaintiff brought an action against Warmington Development, Inc., who constructed
the home, in four counts for negligence, breach of implied warranty, strict liability, and nui-
sance. A fifth count named the Coppingers for misrepresenting the nature and extent of the
termite problem and the likelihood that it would recur. Id. at 887, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
41. Id. at 887, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
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her verified complaint to discharge her burden of proof.42 Relying on
Malcolm, the court reasoned, "we do not believe that a defendant
may rebut the plaintiff's showing simply by presenting counter affi-
davits which controvert the plaintiff's evidence and raise triable is-
sues of fact on the merits of the case."' The court concluded that
defendants' failure to produce independent evidence of bad faith or
improper purpose precluded expungement under section 409.1."
Citing Brownlee v. Vang," defendants further contended that
an action to impose a constructive trust on real property was not an
action affecting the title or possession of real property. 4" The court
rejected defendants' reliance on Brownlee and reasoned that "the ba-
sis of the [Brownlee] decision was the failure to describe the property
in the complaint, so that it was impossible to determine whether the
complaint and the notice of lis pendens referred to the same
property."
The Coppinger court expunged the lis pendens under section
409.2.' 8 It found that defendants' posting of an undertaking would
adequately secure the relief requested by plaintiff since her interest
in the property was purely monetary.49
Essentially, plaintiff in Coppinger was concerned with the abil-
ity to recover a money judgment. A lis pendens, however, will not
support an action for money damages alone.5" Because plaintiff
could plead in the alternative and was not required to make an elec-
tion of remedies,81 she arguably gained unwarranted leverage
through the use of a lis pendens. In other words, plaintiff gained
rights in defendants' new property without having to show any enti-
42. Id.
43. Id. at 888, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 27-28.
44. Id. at 890, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 28-29.
45. 206 Cal. App. 2d 814, 24 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1962).
46. Coppinger v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 890, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 29. Defen-
dants also argued that any judgment secured in the underlying suit would be their own per-
sonal liability and not affect the title or possession of their property. Petitioner's Notice of
Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens Notice From Record at 7. Id. at 883, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
47. Id. at 890-91, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 29. The court also cited Marshall v. Marshall, 232
Cal. App. 2d 232, 42 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1965) standing for the proposition that an action to
impress a constructive trust is an action for the recovery of real property within Code of Civil
Procedure section 318 (prescribing a five-year statute of limitation).
48. 134 Cal. App. 3d at 892, 185 Cal. Rptr. 30.
49. Id. at 892, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 30.
50. Allied E. Fin. v. Goheen Enter., 265 Cal. App. 2d at 134, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
51. See Brandolino v. Lindsay, 269 Cal. App. 2d 319, 75 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1969) (lis
pendens does not operate to preclude money damages in event specific performance is not
decreed).
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tlement to those rights merely by filing a lis pendens5' which, when
expunged, provided a security bond. The gravaman of this argument
is that the property was not unique to plaintiff, nor perhaps even
necessary for the resolution of the underlying claim; plaintiff was not
claiming the title or possession of the property itself.
In cases prior to Coppinger, when courts granted expungement
under section 409.2, a nexus existed between the underlying claim
and the property in question.5" In Coppinger, however, because
plaintiff alleged a constructive trust she gained the advantage of be-
ing able to file a lis pendens. The lis pendens enabled plaintiff to
secure either the property or, upon expungement, at least a mone-
tary security.
Thus, plaintiff's remedy appears extraordinary where, in es-
sence, defendants' property had no relation to the transaction that
was the basis of plaintiff's suit.5 Unlike the situation in Coppinger,
when the property is unique to a plaintiff or is the subject of the
underlying claim the plaintiff has a significant interest in protecting
the particular property. If the property is transferred, pendente lite,
the plaintiff could never be fully compensated. 5
Coppinger, however, allowed a lis pendens in what essentially
was an ordinary fraud action. Plaintiff was not claiming the title to
or possession of defendants' property, but rather was looking to the
property to secure a possible money judgment. Read broadly, Cop-
pinger opens the door for subtle and creative pleading in any fraud
action. By alleging a constructive trust, or even an equitable lien, a
plaintiff, who at most should be considered only a general creditor,
effectively becomes a secured creditor with the availability of a lis
pendens. Yet, in the normal attachment scheme, courts are divided
on whether an attachment is proper in a fraud action."
52. See also Sclar, From the Courts: New Jersey Lis Pendens Statute Constitutional, II
REAL EST. L.J., 158, 159 (1982) (discussing Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders, 519 F. Supp. 1252
(D.N.J. 1981), vacated, 670 F.2d 1316 (3rd Cir. 1982)).
53. See, e.g., Trapasso v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 561, 140 Cal. Rptr. 821
(1977) (action seeking specific performance to convey one-third interest in real property);
Empfield v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 105, 108 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1973) (action to rescind
contract and reacquire real property transferred as down payment).
54. The lis pendens assumes, in this situation, that property is the only asset available
with which to satisfy a possible judgment.
55. Cf CAL. CIv. CODE. § 3387 (Deering 1972).
56. See Klein v. Benaron, 247 Cal. App. 2d 607, 56 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1967) (attachment
issued in cause of action for fraud where court found an implied promise to pay); Hecht v.
Smith, 183 Cal. App. 2d 723, 7 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1960) (attachment issued in cause of action
for fraud where defendant was alleged to be non-resident of state); Yosemite v. Case-Swayne,
73 Cal. App. 2d 806, 167 P.2d 541 (1946) (attachment issued in cause of action for direct
[Vol. 24
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The Brownlee court, referring to the effect of an improperly
filed lis pendens, stated that "any litigant [can] effectively tie up the
title of another litigant in an ordinary action for money [damages]
with complete immunity to the requirement for posting attachment
bonds." 57 Thus, the lis pendens procedure, in the context of actions
to impose constructive trusts or equitable liens, may give rights to a
plaintiff with insufficient process.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
A. Constructive Trusts and Equitable Liens
Special rules for land are based on the rationale that because
land is unique, an owner has a special interest to protect. The rem-
edy of constructive trust was created to prevent unjust enrichment
where it was inequitable for a defendant to hold title to or an inter-
est in certain property. 8 The only conditions necessary, in order to
create a constructive trust, are "the existence of some interest in
property, one's right to that interest, and another's gain of that inter-
est by fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, or the violation of a
trust or other wrongful act."5 '
Because a constructive trust is purely a remedial device, courts
can administer it with considerable flexibility.60 It is usually en-
forced whenever specific restitution in equity is appropriate." A con-
structive trust may be imposed only by court decree; it cannot be
created through the parties' intentions.6'
Factual variations may permit the imposition of an equitable
lien rather than a constructive trust." The difference is that a con-
payment of money regardless of allegation of fraud); Runkle v. Lane, 40 Cal. App. 2d 654,
105 P.2d 373 (1940) (attachment stands in action for fraud on implied promise to pay); Stone
v. Superior Court, 214 Cal. 272, 4 P.2d 777 (1931) (attachment will not lie in action for fraud
where plaintiff sought rescission and right to recovery of money or property) (emphasis added).
57. Brownlee v. Vang, 206 Cal. App. 2d at 817, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
58. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES, § 9.6 (1973).
59. Kraus v. Willow Park Public Golf Course, 73 Cal. App. 3d 354, 140 Cal. Rptr. 744
(1977); see also A.W. ScOTT, LAW OF TRUSTS, § 462 (3d ed. 1967); CAL. CIV. CODE § 2224
(Deering 1972) (involuntary trusts).
60. D. DOBBS, supra note 58, § 4.3. Moreover, at least in theory, a constructive trust or
equitable lien is only imposed where plaintiff's funds are traced to other funds or property. Id.
§ 5.16.
61. Id. § 4.3. The remedy may be denied if it would work an unwarranted preference
over creditors.
62. G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS, § 77 (5th ed. 1973). The decree is retroactive to the
date when the unlawful holding began.
63. An equitable lien is essentially a limited form of a constructive trust and is used
when a plaintiff is entitled to only part of the property to which the lien attaches. D. DOBBS,
19841
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structive trust gives complete title to a plaintiff and the equitable lien
affords plaintiff only a security interest in the property which can
later be used to satisfy a money judgment. 4
A constructive trust or an equitable lien, may be imposed in
three factual situations: (1) for claims arising out of the subject prop-
erty itself, and where, because the property is unique to plaintiff,
money damages are not an adequate remedy;" (2) for claims arising
between plaintiff and defendant out of a transaction concerning the
subject property and, although money damages are an adequate rem-
edy, plaintiff seeks to rescind the transaction and reacquire the prop-
erty;"' and (3) for claims arising out of facts not connected with the
subject property, where money damages are an adequate remedy but
plaintiff seeks a constructive trust or an equitable lien as security. e7
In each situation, the plaintiff is concerned with a different in-
terest. In the third situation a plaintiff's position is analogous to a
general creditor." The property is not unique to plaintiff; the allega-
tions of a constructive trust or an equitable lien act only as a collat-
eral means to collect money damages. When these allegations are
coupled with a lis pendens, a plaintiff gets the benefit of an interim
remedy and gains priority in a defendant's property without having
to show probable cause. It is this priority a plaintiff acquires in the
property that "triggers" the due process clause."
B. Due Process
Due Process prohibits states from depriving an individual of
property without notice and an opportunity to be heard.70 In any
due process analysis it must first be determined whether there is a
significant deprivation of property, and second, whether that depri-
vation is accomplished through some state-provided mechanism."
supra note 58, § 4.3.
64. The equitable lien may be "foreclosed" and sale proceeds applied to the payment of
the claim. An equitable lien, like a constructive trust, may give the lienholder preference over
other creditors. D. DOBBS, supra note 58, § 4.3; A.W. SCOTT, supra note 59, § 463; RE-
STATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, § 161 comment b (1937).
65. Sclar, supra note 52, at 162. This would usually be in the form of specific perform-
ance. See also, supra note 21.
66. Sclar, supra note 52, at 162. A constructive trust acts as a mechanism to restore the
parties to their prior position. See also D. DOBBS, supra note 58, § 9.4.
67. Sclar, supra note 52, at 162.
68. Id.
69. See Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders, 519 F. Supp. at 1263.
70. U.S. CONST. amends. V and XIV, § 1; See also CAL. CONST., art. 1, §§ 7 and 15.
71. E.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). For a discussion of property depriva-
tion and state action in the lis pendens procedure, see Comment, After Malcolm v. Superior
[Vol. 24
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A taking does not necessarily result in actual dispossession."'
Due process encompasses more than the "thing" which a person
owns.7 A lis pendens does not deprive a property owner of posses-
sion but interferes with the right to freely encumber or alienate the
property.7 4 Understandably, the economic implications from such in-
terference can hardly be described as "de minimus." 75
The lis pendens is a creature of statute; it becomes effective only
upon recordation by a county recorder and has no separate existence
from the lawsuit to which it calls attention.7  Thus, the statutory
scheme providing for the imposition of a lis pendens probably satis-
fies the state action requirement."
The more important consideration in a due process analysis is
whether the statutory procedure adequately identifies, weighs and
accomodates the competing interests in the property.
One California court characterized the lis pendens procedure as
being similar in purpose to an attachment of real property.78 There-
fore, to better understand whether the lis pendens procedure consti-
tutionally protects the competing interests in the property, it is neces-
sary to examine pre-judgment attachment procedures. Traditionally,
pre-judgment attachment statutes that failed to provide adequate no-
tice and hearing were held unconstitutional on the basis of over-
breadth. 7' The statutes' common fatal flaw was that they were ap-
Court and Peery v. Superior Court: A Due Process Analysis of California Lis Pendens, 70
CALIF. L. REv. 909, 919-26 (1982).
72. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. at 10; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917).
73. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. at 10.
74. Empfield v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 108, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
Empfield rejected a constitutional challenge of the lis pendens statute on the grounds that a lis
pendens did not deprive an owner of the use of property. The court conceded that the marketa-
bility of the property was impaired but upheld the impairment on the theory that the state
must ensure that prospective buyers are provided with effective notice of litigation. The court
assumes, however, that in all cases the property is unique or necessary to a resolution of the
underlying claim. See also CEB, supra note 2, at 60-61 (property virtually unmarketable and
uninsurable with lis pendens).
75. See Connolly Dev. Co. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 803, 553 P.2d 637, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 477 (1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 1056 (1977). Connolly concerned the constitu-
tionality of California's mechanic's lien statutes. The statutes were upheld in order to provide
a remedy for a creditor whose work went into the subject property. The dissent, however,
noted that a mechanic's lien "poses a threat pointed directly at the vitals of the debtor's eco-
nomic independence," i.e., his home, his principal asset. Id. at 839, 553 P.2d at 661, 132 Cal.
Rptr. at 501 (Richardson, J., dissenting). The effect of a lis pendens is no different.
76. Garcia v. Pinhero, 22 Cal. App. 2d 194, 197, 70 P.2d 675 (1937); Albertson v.
Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d at 379, 295 P.2d at 408.
77. See supra note 75.
78. Howden-Goetzl v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. App. 3d at 138, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
79. E.g., Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bayview, 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Note,
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plied in instances where no overriding state's or creditor's interests
justified the summary procedure.80
In comparing the lis pendens to pre-judgment attachment stat-
utes, however, one commentator argued that the lis pendens does not
suffer from the same deficiency because it concerns actions that affect
only title to or possession of real property.81 This argument ignores
the fact that a statute which operates narrowly is not necessarily free
from defects inherent in its procedure.
Sniadach v. Family Finance, Inc.82 and its progeny88 illustrate
the constitutional limits on pre-judgment attachment schemes that
fail to provide adequate notice and hearing. In Sniadach, the United
States Supreme Court held that the interests of the debtor, creditor
and state must be considered in evaluating the due process afforded
in an attachment scheme." California follows the United States Su-
preme Court's rationale. In Randone v. Appellate Dept.85 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court recognized that summary procedures should
be allowed only where exigent circumstances warrant the use of an
interim remedy." Randone expressed no judicial determination re-
garding real estate attachments. The court did, however, note a need
in any ex parte proceeding to balance the respective interests.87
In determining the constitutional adequacy of a statute, the par-
supra note 21, at 437.
80. Note, supra note 21, at 437.
81. Id. at 439. The United States Court of Appeal came to the same conclusion in
Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders, 670 F.2d 1316, 1329 (3d Cir. 1982). Fedders challenged the consti-
tutionality of New Jersey's is pendens statute and contended that the failure to provide "an
expeditious post-filing notice and hearing before a judicial officer" to establish, inter alia,
whether the claim affects an interest in realty or merely constitutes a claim for money dam-
ages, offends due process. The court rejected Fedders's argument, reasoning that the limited
application of the statute is protection enough against meritless claims. The court noted that a
lis pendens was not a general creditor's remedy but failed to elaborate on that observation. Id.
at 1329. The New Jersey lis pendens statute, however, explicitly provides that a lis pendens
may be filed in an action seeking to impose an equitable lien.
82. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
83. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600
(1974); North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
84. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 607.
85. 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971).
86. Id. at 557, 488 P.2d at 27, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 723. Randone concerned the attachment
of a debtor's bank account. The court recognized that there was always a risk that a debtor
could conceal or transfer any assets to avoid future execution. "We do not believe, however,
that the mere potential mobility of an asset suffices, in itself, to justify depriving all owners of
the use of such property on a general basis. Instead, in balancing the competing interests of all
parties, we believe a more particularized showing of actual danger of absconding or concealing
in the individual case must be required." Id. at 557 n.20, 488 P.2d at 27 n.20, 96 Cal. Rptr.
at 723 n.20.
87. Randone v. Appellate Dept., 5 Cal. 3d at 557, 488 P.2d at 27, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
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amount consideration must be to balance the opposing interests in
view of the statutory purpose.88 Similarly, in evaluating the due pro-
cess afforded by the lis pendens procedure, the competing interests in
the property must be balanced. The recording party's interest is in
the resolution of the claim, particularly when the action seeks spe-
cific performance of a land sale contract. The unique quality of land
to a particular plaintiff demands that his claim not be defeated by
the transfer of the property, pendente lite. The defendant's interest,
on the other hand, varies with his plans for the property. 8' If the
owner has no plans for the property, then arguably, there is no dep-
rivation.90 If the lis pendens is challenged by the defendant, im-
pliedly it is causing some deprivation. The state's interest is in en-
suring an orderly recording system for the smooth and effective
transfer of real property. In addition, the effect of the state's interest
is not restricted to notifying third parties of pending litigation; it also
ensures prompt satisfaction of judgments entered in the subject
litigation.' 1
The lis pendens procedure does not distinguish between the
classes of plaintiffs which affect the balancing of these interests. For
example, when a lis pendens is filed it is assumed that the property
is unique to a particular plaintiff or is necessary to achieve an effec-
tive resolution of the underlying claim. Because the plaintiff is not
required to show any exigencies demanding the benefit of an interim
remedy, the burden is left to the defendant to challenge the lis
pendens.
If the defendant moves for expungement under section 409.1,
the issue is whether the underrjting cause of action affects the title to
or possession of the subject property." If the property is truly
unique to the plaintiff, expungement should be denied. On the other
hand, if a plaintiff alleges a constructive trust or an equitable lien on
property to secure only money damages, the action circumvents the
true purpose of a lis pendens which is to give notice of pending liti-
gation and not to give plaintiff added leverage in a lawsuit.9'
Upon close examination of the latter situation, however, the
balance tips in favor of the plaintiff whose claim arose out of the
88. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 607.
89. See Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders, 519 F. Supp. at 1262.
90. Id. A lis pendens does not affect use and enjoyment of property.
91. Note, supra note 21, at 440.
92. In addition, the recording party must evidence that the action was filed in good
faith. See supra, note 30.
93. Empfield v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 108, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
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subject property." Although money damages may be an adequate
remedy, there may also be some merit to the claim that the plaintiff
is entitled to the property itself. The lis pendens functions as a
means for the court to assert control over the subject matter of the
litigation."8 If the property has no relation to the underlying claim,
but functions only as a security device, the balance weighs in favor of
the defendant being afforded a hearing on the validity of the plain-
tiff's claim. Moreover, the state's interest is diminished because, ab-
sent some sort of judicial intervention, there is no longer a compel-
ling need to preserve the particular property.
When the property is not related to the underlying claim, the
plaintiff is similar to an attachment creditor for whom a pre- or
post-filing hearing is constitutionally required." The lis pendens
procedure, however, assumes that the property will be transferred
during litigation, or that the defendant will be unable to pay a po-
tential money judgment.97 Yet, the prospective inability to pay a pos-
sible money judgment is not grounds for an attachment on that fact
alone." The use of a lis pendens on property in which a plaintiff is
seeking security for money only becomes an anomoly in view of the
statutory purpose behind the lis pendens. In effect, the plaintiff is
using the lis pendens to secure a private advantage. The result is that
the defendant is denied due process guarantees.
California courts have recognized that a statutory procedure by
which one litigant is forced to relinquish a property interest for the
benefit of another effects a "taking" of property, entitling the former
to prior procedural safeguards." It has been suggested that section
409.2 was enacted to cover precisely those situations in which a
plaintiff's interest in property is purely monetary.1 00 When expung-
ing a lis pendens under section 409.2, the issue is whether adequate
relief can be accorded to the plaintiff if the motion is granted. 01 If
the lis pendens is expunged the defendant may be required to post a
bond or suitable undertaking. Under this procedure, though, a defen-
94. Id. at 108, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 375. See infra notes 108-110 and accompanying text.
95. Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders, 670 F.2d at 1318.
96. Sclar, supra note 52, at 162.
97. It assumes that there are no other assets available for execution. Control of specific
property may not be necessary for an effective resolution of the claim. See generally Comment,
supra note 19, at 79.
98. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 483.010 (Deering 1972 & Supp. 1983).
99. Beaudreau v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d 448, 457, 535 P.2d 713, 718, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 585, 590 (1975).
100. Comment, supra note 19, at 79.
101. See supra note 32.
[Vol. 24
LIS PENDENS
dant is merely being given a choice of two deprivations. 1" The re-
quirement that the defendant post a bond or an undertaking has
been held to be a "taking" demanding the protection of adequate
procedural safeguards.?1
In Beaudreau v. Superior Court,104 security for costs statutes
were invalidated because they failed to provide a hearing to deter-
mine whether the statute's purpose was promoted by the imposition
of an undertaking. 05 The court further noted that the statutes failed
to provide guidelines for determining a "reasonable" undertaking.,,
Applying that rationale to the undertaking requirement in section
409.2, the correct inquiry should be whether the undertaking re-
quirement furthers the statutory purpose.
The purpose of section 409.2 is to provide security to a plaintiff
in the event the lis pendens is expunged and the property cannot be
used to satisfy a possible judgment. The state's interest is in securing
some sort of relief for the plaintiff.
In those situations where there is a nexus between the property
and the underlying cause of action, there is justification for the im-
position of an undertaking. 0 The court, in Empfield v. Superior
Court,1 8 articulated that an undertaking is appropriate when "it is
beyond the court's power to return the real property to the [plaintiff]
in its original state."" The property in Empfield had been materi-
ally changed by the construction of two houses on it. The court
stated that it was therefore important that adequate relief be secured
to the plaintiffs by the defendant's posting of a suitable
102. Comment, supra note 71, at 927.
103. Brooks v. Small Claims Court, 8 Cal. 3d 661, 667, 504 P.2d 1249, 1253, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 785, 789 (1973) (reaffirming principle that even temporary measures may constitute a
taking; neither eventual recovery of probpty nor posting of a bond remedy loss of use of
property). Accord, Beaudreau v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d at 455, 535 P.2d at 716-17, 121
Cal. Rptr. at 588-89.
104. 14 Cal. 3d 448, 535 P.2d 713, 121 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1975). Beaudreau concerned an
action brought by students and parents against a school district. Defendant school district de-
manded that plaintiffs post a $25,700 undertaking as security for costs which might be
awarded against plaintiffs, pursuant to Government Code sections 947 and 951. Failure to post
the undertaking meant dismissal of the action. Plaintiffs attacked the constitutionality of the
statutes.
105. Id. at 459, 535 P.2d at 720, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
106. Id. at 460, 535 P.2d at 721, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
107. The Beaudreau court noted that where both parties had "current, real interests in
the property," the rules providing for a pre-judgment attachment hearing might be relaxed. Id.
at 464, 535 P.2d at 724, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 596. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600
(1974).
108. 33 Cal. App. 3d 105, 108 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1973).
109. Id. at 108, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
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undertaking.'"
Where the property is not unique to the plaintiff there is less
justification for imposing the undertaking requirement without first
affording the defendant a hearing.' The plaintiff is no different
than a general creditor in this context. The state's interest is in se-
curing some sort of relief for the prevailing party. But, in cases
where there is no possibility of a judgment being rendered against a
defendant, there is no justification for denying a defendant due
process.11
V. ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRESENT Lis PENDENS PROCEDURE
Without a procedure to determine whether the plaintiff's claims
are legitimately connected to the subject property, there is a substan-
tial risk that a defendant in an ordinary fraud action could be un-
duly burdened by a lis pendens. Due process requires at least "judi-
cial participation in the initial taking and an 'early hearing' at which
time the party imposing the taking demonstrates probable cause to
justify it." ' Thus, the use of a lis pendens in an action seeking to
impose a constructive trust or an equitable lien on property requires
that the relation of the property to the effective resolution of the un-
derlying claim be determined. The lis pendens statute, however, pro-
vides no procedure to determine the competing interests in the prop-
erty. Instead, it is assumed that in every case, either the state's or the
creditor's interest compels the taking without first affording the de-
fendant a hearing.
The defendant's interests would be accomodated if the lis
pendens statute provided a pr6cedure similar to the current attach-
ment procedure.1 ' Thus, a lis pendens would be authorized only
after a noticed hearing. Before a lis pendens can be filed on the
110. id.
111. See Beaudreau v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d at 459, 535 P.2d at 720, 121 Cal.
Rptr. at 592. Moreover, a defendant may be required to bear the costs of the expungement
process. CAL. CIv. Poc. CODE § 409.3 (Deering 1972 & Supp. 1983) (award of attorney fees
to prevailing party); Trapasso v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d at 569, 140 Cal. Rptr. at
825.
112. "We have repeatedly recognized that statutes providing a procedure according to
which one litigant can be forced to relinquish an interest in his property for the benefit of
another effectuate a 'taking' of property, entitling the former to prior procedural safeguards."
Beaudreau v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d at 457, 535 P.2d at 718, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 590. See
Brooks v. Small Claims Court, 8 Cal. 3d 661, 504 P.2d 1249, 105 Cal. Rptr. 785.
113. Beaudreau v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d at 465, 535 P.2d at 724, 121 Cal. Rptr.
at 596 (quoting North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 607 (1975)).
114. CAL. Civ. Ptoc. CODE § 484.040 (Deering 1972 & Supp. 1983) (no order or writ
of attachment issued until after notice and hearing).
[Vol. 24
LIS PENDENS
property, the party seeking to impose a constructive trust or an equi-
table lien on property should be required to file notice pending a
hearing to show cause.11 At the hearing, which could be provided
for automatically within fifteen days, the recording party would be
required to show the probable validity"1 ' of the claim. Furthermore,
the court should consider additional oral or documentary evidence
and additional points and authorities,"' as it does in attachment pro-
ceedings. This procedure would allow the court to make a determi-
nation of the uniqueness of the property to the plaintiff's claim, and
would afford the defendant better protection against claims which
may be for money damages only."1
Additionally, a procedure similar to the attachment procedure
could provide for an ex parte issuance of a protective or restraining
order if the plaintiff would be irreparably injured if the order were
delayed until the matter could be heard on notice."" The issuance of
a temporary protective order upon the plaintiff's affirmative showing
of need would avoid due process objections which exist under the
current lis pendens statute when the property is restrained without a
sufficient showing of state or creditor interest. In addition, a provi-
sion for an automatic hearing would probably not unduly burden the
defendant.120 Similarly, if the notice stays on record until the hear-
ing, the state's interest is not affected.
If the court determines that the plaintiff has a compelling right
to the property itself or to the property as security, the court could
then demand the posting of an undertaking. In this regard, the de-
fendant would be further protected because he would be afforded a
hearing prior to posting a bond.
VI. CONCLUSION
In actions seeking to impose a constructive trust or an equitable
lien for the recovery of money, there may be no competing interests
in the property itself that would justify the summary treatment of
115. Id. § 484.050 (requires notice of application and a hearing on right to attach).
116. Id. § 481.190 provides in pertinent part: "[a] claim has 'probable validity' where it
is more likely than not that the plaintiff will obtain a judgment against the defendant."
117. Id. § 484.090(d) (upon a showing of good cause, the court may receive additional
evidence or continue a hearing for production of additional evidence).
118. Because of the shortened time period, the state's interest might not be significantly
impaired.
119. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 485.010(a), .101(b)(1), .101(b)(4) (Deering 1972 &
Supp. 1983).
120. The defendant would no longer be burdened with challenging the lis pendens.
Moreover, the plaintiff would still be required to show the probable validity of the claim.
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the claim's merits as afforded by the lis pendens procedure. The use
of a lis pendens under these facts becomes nothing more than a cred-
itor's remedy of attachment.
Yet, in the context of creditor's remedies, California courts have
characterized the necessary inquiry to be whether the statute affected
a constitutional accomodation of the conflicting interests of the par-
ties. Clearly, in an action for specific performance or rescission of a
land sale contract, there may be compelling interests that justify the
use of a provisional remedy to gain control of the property for an
effective adjudication of the claim. But, as Coppinger illustrated,
there may be no interest other than securing a claim for money dam-
ages. An action solely for money damages does not warrant the use
of a lis pendens because it allows a plaintiff who is nothing more
than a general creditor to gain priority in a defendant's property
without a showing of probable cause.
To require a plaintiff who alleges a constructive trust or an
equitable lien on property to follow a procedure similar to attach-
ment would ensure the defendant more equitable treatment under
the lis pendens statutes. The hearing requirement on the probable
validity of the claim guarantees due process. Where the plaintiff is
not seeking title to or possession of real property, a hearing protects
a defendant from a deprivation of property for weak or meritless
claims. In any litigation, fairness demands that the risks should be
borne by those least likely to prevail.
Priscilla A. Brown
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